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An open area of research for complex, cyber-physical systems is how to adequately
support decision making using reliability and failure data early in the systems engi-
neering process. Having meaningful reliability and failure data available early offers
information to decision makers at a point in the design process where decisions have
a high impact to cost ratio. When applied to conceptual system design, widely used
methods such as probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) and failuremodes effects and critical-
ity analysis (FMECA) are limited by the availability of data and often rely on detailed
representations of the system. Further, existing methods for system reliability and
failure methods have not addressed failure propagation in conceptual system design
prior to selecting candidate architectures. Consideration given to failure propagation
primarily focuses on the basic representation where failures propagate forward. In
order to address the shortcomings of existing reliability and failuremethods, this paper
presents the function failure propagation potentialmethodology (FFPPM) to formalize
the types of failure propagation andquantify failure propagation potential for complex,
cyber-physical systems during the conceptual stage of system design. Graph theory is
leveraged to model and quantify the connectedness of the functional block diagram
(FBD) to develop the metrics used in FFPPM. The FFPPMmetrics include (i) the sum-
mation of the reachability matrix, (ii) the summation of the number of paths between
nodes (i.e., functions) i and j for all i and j, and (iii) the degree and degree distribu-
tion. In plain English, these metrics quantify the reachability between functions in the
graph, the number of paths between functions, and the connectedness of each node.
The FFPPM metrics can then be used to make candidate architecture selection deci-
sions andbeused as early indicators for risk. Theunique contribution of this research is
to quantify failure propagation potential during conceptual system design of complex,
cyber-physical systems prior to selecting candidate architectures. FFPPM has been
demonstrated using the example of an emergency core cooling system (ECCS) system
in a pressurized water reactor (PWR).
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1 INTRODUCTION
An increased demand for suitable design techniques used in devel-
oping engineered systems has become more prevalent in recent
decades.1–3 Customer and end user expectations for system designs
continue to push for higher performance at less cost.4 In addition,
designers are forced to meet aggressive delivery schedules.5 As a
result, systems often suffer major reliability concerns. Consequently, it
has become well known that making correct early system design deci-
sions offers several advantages including reduced design and analysis
cost, increased freedom to make decisions that have a high impact on
the design, and potential for applying methods to a larger number of
design alternatives.6,7
Risk, reliability, and safety methods are used to assess the system
relative to hazards, failures, etc., and then identify ways to improve
the system.8 An abundance of methods currently exist, each of which
have seen varying degrees of success in terms of adoption by practi-
tioners (e.g., the state of the art in industry is probabilistic risk analysis
[PRA] 9 and failuremodes effects and criticality analysis [FMECA] 10,11
while academia has developed more advanced methods that have yet
to be adopted.12–15) While common methods such as PRA have been
deemed as valuable, the majority of these methods do not critically
assess failure propagation.16 Thepropagation of a failure in thiswork is
defined as the spectrum of potential paths caused by an initiating fail-
ure. The way that failure propagation is assessed in the design, that
is, through Fault Tree Analysis (FTA),17 Event Tree Analysis (ETA),18
and PRA, is different than how it occurs in reality.19 For example, the
consequence, or output, of PRA is typically a very basic description of
the system’s state—either failed or not.20 This consequence is mod-
eled in connection to basic failure events via the fault trees.17 The
result is a cause–consequence relationship, which propagates the fail-
ure from cause to consequence.21 Analytically, probability of occur-
rence can be quantified from a PRA 21; however, there are two lim-
itations with this approach as it relates to the research presented in
this paper. First, for mitigating the risk of propagated failures PRA is
only as good as the basic failure events modeled in the fault trees and
events/barriers in the event tree.20 Second, PRA is missing the holistic
connectedness of the system. The cause–consequence relationship in
PRA is estimated by analyzing diagrams andmodels. This analysis does
not identify failures that propagate in nonstandard or unanticipated
ways.20 Further, portions of the system can be omitted if, for example,
they are less known by the practitioner. These deficiencies leave signif-
icant uncertainty for designers to manage during the detailed design
process.22
Both widely accepted and academic failure propagation techniques
generally lack a comprehensive ability to analyze the propagation
of failures in the functional design of complex, cyber-physical sys-
tems. By their nature, complex, cyber-physical systems have a high
degree of connectedness (e.g., networks, automation equipment),23
and therefore have significant risk of failure propagating through-
out the system.24 Well-developed physics-based models that contain
simultaneous equation solvers allow analysis of both forward and
backward failure propagation, which propagate failures either with or
against the nominal flows in the functional block diagram (FBD).25–27
However, in the earliest stages of system design where detailed
physics-based models are not available, existing failure analysis meth-
ods seek to only model forward propagate failures. One exception to
this is the uncoupled failure flow state reasoner (UFFSR) method that
addresses various types of directional failure propagation.16 While
this method is well-informed on failure propagation types, it requires
knowledge of the system’s components. While forward propagation
is a major element of how failures propagate, backward propagation
andalsopropagation across uncoupled subsystemboundaries canhave
significant impacts on the system.24 In the research presented in this
paper, the authors seek to model failure propagation during concep-
tual design by using FBDs and graph theory with the goal to describe
the behavior of how propagation can occur before physics-based simu-
lations are available. This work can be generalized for system design
practitioners to create assessments during functional system design
when component information is not available.
In this paper, the FBD is represented as a directed graph and an
adjacency matrix. In the directed graph, edges represent functional
flows (i.e., material, energy, and signal) and nodes represent func-
tions. These three models (i.e., the FBD, graph, and adjacency matrix)
represent the nominal version of the system. Each model is updated
with potential failure propagation paths to yield an analogous set of
system models. Within the updated models, each path initiates at a
failed function and then propagates within the FBD based on prede-
fined behavior variables embedded within functional flows. Metrics
are then proposed to measure the failure propagation potential of
both versions of the system models (i.e., nominal version and failure
propagation version). From these system models, several metrics are
proposed including (i) the summation of the reachability matrix, (ii) the
summation of the number of paths between nodes (i.e., functions) i and
j for all i and j, and (iii) the degree and degree distribution.
This paper builds directly on previous research 24 published by the
same authors at the INCOSE International Symposium. In the previ-
ous paper, graph theorywas applied to FBDs to quantify attributes of a
system including connectedness and reachability. The work presented
here extends the previous research to further include the graph’s
degree and degree distribution as an additional metric. Further, the
research has been developed as a formal system engineering design
method, which is named the function failure propagation potential
methodology (FFPPM).
1.1 Specific contributions
Specific contributions of this work include;
1. the development of amethodology used to predict the failure prop-
agation potential of a complex, cyber-physical system during func-
tional design;
2. the formalization of failure propagation flow types; and
3. the expansion of functional behavior variables and their relation-
ship to the functional basis.
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2 RELATED RESEARCH
Early design failure analysis has become a thrust area in research
related to complex, cyber-physical systems and reliability
engineering.27–34 Identifying and mitigating failures in early sys-
tem design have been addressed by several methods in literature.
Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) quantifies a likelihood of
occurrence, likelihood of detection, and severity for each failure mode
identified.35,36 FMECA extends FMEA by including a failure mode’s
criticality.10,37,38 The different representation in risk leads to FMECA
being preferred in the aerospace and nuclear industry and FMEA in the
automotive industry. Both FMECA and FMEA rely heavily on expert
experience to generate risk values.While these basic methods provide
a foundation for many failure methods, there are several limitations
including intensity of manual labor, usability during functional design,
and informality.39 As a result, several other methods and software
tools have been developed to improve on the original FMEA and
FMECAmethods.
Knowledge-Based FMEA (WIFA),40 FMEA streamlining,41 concept
failure mode analysis (CFMA),42 advanced FMEA,43,44 and function-
level analysis of failure mode effects (FLAME) 45,46 are examples
of improved methods and tools for performing FMEA and FMECA.
FLAME and WIFA reduce high user workload by using an archived
knowledge base.WIFA, advanced FMEA, and CFMA indicate the phys-
ical cause of the failure and are practical for mechanical systems while
FLAME is not. However, FLAME, CFMA, and advanced FMEA can
be used during functional design. A major limitation to these meth-
ods is that they do not use a formalized failure language to accu-
rately and consistently define failure modes. One answer to this is
the function failure design method (FFDM), which uses a formal-
ized failure language to improve the automation of identifying fail-
ure modes and improving scalability to complex systems through a
conceptual systemmodeling approach implemented using a functional
modeling technique.12 Further, FFDM is extended by the risk in early
design (RED) method, which introduces failure mode severity and like-
lihood of occurrence, 47–49 and the function failure rate designmethod
(FFRDM), which corrects the likelihood of occurrence calculations in
both FFDM and RED.50,51 These techniques have broadened the capa-
bility of failure analysis by allowing designers to evaluate the function-
ality of a systemprior to formal architecturebeingdefined.While these
methods encourage the early discovery of failures, they are unable to
address the propagation of failures.
PRA was developed partially in response to the shortcomings of
FMEA and FMECA, 9,21,52–55 which is primarily emphasized in the
WASH-1400 study for nuclear power.56 PRA and its extensions are
heavily used in the aerospace and nuclear power industries.57 In PRA,
a failure probability can be calculated via fault and event treemodeling
of a system.17,20,58–60 While this method models failure propagation
through the use of fault and event trees, these are not an accurate and
complete representation of the failure propagation. For example, the
analysis only considers the failure propagation path to exist through
failing other items (i.e., physical), and therefore omits important details
(i.e., functional). In this context, PRA does not assess the true failure
propagation pathways, but instead the failure propagation is turned
into something that is useful to PRA. PRA is also not well suited for
early conceptual design studies of system risk where the system mod-
els lack fidelity.
There is also relevant work that uses network graphs in failure anal-
ysis. This work is relevant during conceptual system design and uses
network graphs to model the important aspects of the system. Kur-
toglu and Tumer develop the function failure identification and prop-
agation (FFIP) method to assess a system once the basic architec-
ture is defined.61 This is done by propagating failures through the sys-
tem and results in the system’s functional health. This work has been
extended is a variety of ways.62–70 Work by O’Halloran et al. mod-
els failure propagation across uncoupled boundaries in early concep-
tual designs.16 Related work by Jensen has been focused on functional
failure propagation in FBDs and basic functional architectures.28,71,72
Krus and Grantham-Lough propose a method identify failure prop-
agation through common interface; however, this method does not
fully investigate failure propagation paths.73 One overarching limita-
tion of this body of research is that it lacks an approach to quantify
failure propagation prior to components being selected. The proposed
method in this research is used to quantify the propagation of failures
in a purely functional architecture.
The summary of related research clarifies the lack of reliability-
based methods applicable to conceptual system design. Those that do
exist primarily focus on aspects of reliability other than propagation of
failures. As a result, this research focuses on the quantification of fail-
ure propagation potential in FBDs.
3 THE FUNCTION FAILURE PROPAGATION
POTENTIAL METHODOLOGY (FFPPM)
In this section the FFPPM is proposed as a way to model failure prop-
agation in a FBD and estimate its potential. Thus, this section explains
the tenets of the proposed FFPPM.While Section 3 focuses on the pro-
cess and theory using an example, Section 4 presents a detailed case
study as a demonstration of the method. The method itself is intended
to encapsulate the core advances proposed in this research and also
provide a practical process for realizing the advances.
A flowchart describing the steps to apply the FFPPM is presented in
Figure 1. For each step in the flowchart, the required inputs and out-
puts are listed in Table 1. Sections 3.1 through 3.5 are organized by the
steps within FFPPM, in which the process for each step is described.
The major advancements proposed in this research are described in
Section 3.3 (developing failure propagation paths and a classifier for
failure propagation types) and Section 3.5 (developing metrics to mea-
sure failure propagation potential).
FFPPM contains four steps and starts with an input of a nomi-
nal FBD (presented as a pre-step), which is subsequently labeled as
FBDNom. In Step 1, FBDNom is expressed as a graph and a matrix using
the fundamentals of graph theory. The graph andmatrix are specifically
developed for the nominal version of the system (i.e., failure propaga-
tion has not been considered yet). In Step 2, the authors establish a
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F IGURE 1 The FFPPM flowchart demonstrates the process to
quantify failure propagation potential. This flowchart has a pre-step,
used to condition the input for themethod, and four main steps. At the
bottom of each step, the output from that step is listed
process to determine the failure propagation present in the FBDNom.
This step uses historical data and knowledge of behavior variables
embedded within the FBDNom. The goal of this step is to identify the
failure propagation paths and their associated mathematical weights,
thereby creating a new version which is labeled as FBDFail. In Step 3, a
graph andmatrix are developedwith the failure propagation from Step
2. This step is analogous to Step 1. In Step 4, metrics are proposed to
quantify the failure propagation potential including (i) the summation
of the reachability matrix, (ii) the summation of the number of paths
between nodes (i.e., functions) i and j for all i and j, and (iii) the degree
and degree distribution.
3.1 FFPPM prestep: Develop FBDNom
Functionalmodeling has become awell-established step in the systems
engineering design process.74 As a part of functional modeling, FBDs
are used to describe the network of connections between a system’s
functions and flows.25,75 An FBD defines the design intent of a system;
however, it does not indicate how the function is accomplished.75,76
This is captured in the physical architecturewhich is produced at a sub-
sequent step in design,75,77 and also is not used in this research. A sys-
tem boundary delineates the border between the functions included
in the system, which has particular use in this research.75–77 External
flows that cross the system boundary and are acted on by functions
within the system and ultimately exit the system. Specification of a sys-
tem boundary produces the desired set of output flows and also the
appropriate set of flow conversions inside the system boundary.75,78
An important element of an FBD is the common language used for
the function and flow names; in this research we use the functional
basis for engineering design (FBED).78,79 FBED is a taxonomy of func-
tion and flow terminology that offers multiple levels of fidelity as well
as clear definitions for each term. As a part of the FBED common
language, FBDs use material, energy, and signal flows to describe the
connections between functions. Use of a common language allows an
FBD to be consistently developed, well-defined, modeled at the appro-
priate level of fidelity, and leverage design methods and automation
techniques.
3.2 FFPPM Step 1: Construct the functional
graph and adjacency matrix, GNom and A(GNom)
Graph theory is a well-developed field in mathematics originated by
Euler in 1735.80 Graphs are models that contain nodes and edges,
where edges are used to connect nodes. The graph, G, is a pair of sets,
TABLE 1 This table describes the specific inputs and outputs for each step within FFPPM
Method input Method step Method output





(1) Directed graph GNom
(2) Non-binary adjacencymatrix A(GNom)
(1) List of potential functional failures
and corresponding failure rates (𝜆)





(1) Failure propagation flow paths
(2) Mathematical weights for each failure
propagation arc
(3) FBDFail
(1) Failure propagation flow paths




(1) Updated directed graphGFail
(2) Updated nonbinary adjacencymatrix A(GFail)
(1) Updated directed graphGFail




(1) Summation of the reachability matrix
(2) Summation of the number of paths between
nodes i and j
(3) Degree and degree distribution
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F IGURE 2 GNom and A(GNom) representation to describe nodes and edges for an example FBDNom. The value 2 for a2,5 in A(GNom) represents
that two edges exits between Function 2 and the environment
N(G) and E(G); N(G) is the set of nodes and is defined by Equation (1);
E(G) is a set of edges and is defined by Equation (2). A node, ni, can be
connected to any other node, nj, including itself. Edge weight, ei,j, mod-
els strength or importance 81,82 and may have direction (i.e., directed
graphs) or no direction (i.e., undirected graphs). A multigraph may
alternatively be defined for G, which is discussed in.83 In this work, we
use only directed graphs.
N(G) = {n1, n2,… , nN}, (1)
E(G) = {ei,j}. (2)
For the purpose of this research, a graph is equivalently represented
using an adjacency matrix, A(G). The adjacency matrix represents the
connectivity of the nodes using a matrix. Since adjacency matrices are
binary, the authors define a nonbinary adjacencymatrix to allownonbi-
nary values as defined in Equation (3). All future references to the adja-
cencymatrix fallwithin this consideration.Avaluewithin the adjacency
matrix, ai,j, is defined as the summation of all edge weights between
node i and node j. This approach is useful for retaining information such
as the number of edges, k, within ai,j and the individual weight values
for each edge. The functional flow types of material, energy, and signal
are not represented in the graph or the associated adjacency matrix;
however, this knowledge is retained in the original FBD.As such, A(G) is
found using Equation (4) and quantifies the total edge weight between
any two nodes i and j.
ai,j(G) =
{∑K
k wi,j,k if ei,j𝜀 E(G)




a11 a12 … a1J





To demonstrate Step 1, an example FBDNom is modeled as a directed
graph, GNom, as well as an adjacency matrix, A(GNom), in Figure 2. Note
that the environment node in GNom represents anything outside the
system boundary in FBDNom (i.e., flows that cross the system bound-
ary). As anexample, note that Function1 is connected toFunction2and
also receives a flow that crosses the system boundary. These connec-
tions are visually shown in both FBDNom and GNom as well as quantita-
tively shown in GNom (where the combined edge weights are displayed
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F IGURE 3 This figure presents a nominal FBD (top left) as well as three types of failure propagation. Forward propagation is presented in the
top right where Function 5 initiates the failure propagation, which then propagates along the functional flow to Function 2 and also outside the
system boundary. Backward propagation is presented in the bottom left where Function 5 initiates the failure propagation, which then propagates
against the functional flow to Function 4. Finally, uncoupled boundary propagation is presented in the bottom right where Function 5 initiates the
failure propagation, which then propagates to Function 8 along a functional flow that nominally does not exist
oneachedge) andA(GNom).WithinA(GNom), the value for a2,5 is 2,which
shows that Function 2 has two connections to the environment.
3.3 FFPPM Step 2: Develop failure propagation
flows and edge weights
To model failure propagation flows it is important to first under-
stand how failures can propagate. As such, Section 3.3.1 is dedicated
to developing an understanding of this concept. Subsequently in
Section 3.3.2, the modeling of new failure propagation paths, is
presented.
3.3.1 Functional failure propagation types
In this research the authors formalize three types of failure propa-
gation: (1) forward propagation, (2) backward propagation, and (3)
uncoupled boundary propagation. Each type of failure propagation is
explained in detail below. Figure 3 depicts an overview of the failure
propagation types where the red, solid line represents the flow of the
failure. The top left side of Figure 3 is a snippet of a nominal FBDNom
while the other quadrants represent the three types of failure propaga-
tion. In the three that contain failure propagation, Function 5 contains
the initiating failure.
Explicitly representing the types of failure propagation offers a
robust method for inserting new failure edges in the FBDNom. These
failure edges are not modeled in the development of an FBD. This
research assumes that all failure propagation begins with an initiating
failure (discussed in more detail in Section 3.3.2). The resulting path
that the failure follows depends on the type of failure propagation.
Each of these failure propagation types behave differently and each is
explained here. Also, a practical example of each is presented in the fol-
lowing paragraph.
1. Forward propagation. Forward propagation is the most commonly
analyzed type of failure propagation where a failure propagates
from the failed function to the next function in line. This propaga-
tion is in the direction of the flow for flows that exist in the FBDNom.
In Figure 3 (top right), where Function 5 has failed, the failure
propagates out of Function 5 along the existing energy flows.
2. Backward propagation. Backward propagation is less common and
not always analyzed in existing methods. It occurs when a failure
propagates against the nominal direction of the material, energy,
and signal flows. In Figure 3 (bottom left), where Function 5 has
failed, the failure propagates backwards against the energy flow.
3. Uncoupled boundary propagation. Propagation across uncoupled
boundaries is a case where functions interact unexpectedly. In
this scenario, failures propagate between functions that were not
intended to interact and thatwerenotmodeledwith a connection in
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the FBDNom. In Figure 3 (bottom right), where Function 5 has failed,
the failure propagates from Function 5 to Function 8. Prior to this
connection, the two functions do not share a direct relationship.16
This type of failure propagation is particularly valuable as it is
not intentionally captured anywhere else in the modeling pro-
cess for a system. Design issues relating to forward and backward
propagation can theoretically be identified using a simulation and
physics-based modeling during the later stages of the design pro-
cess. However, uncoupled boundary propagation is completely dis-
regarded in the standard design process.
Consider the following example to demonstrate the three propagation
types. While the proposed FFPPM applies to a functional design, this
example uses a physical architecture as it can be more clearly under-
stood. Consider a leaking pipe where the pipe exists as part of a larger
system. This pipe leaking causes a reduced throughput of fluid and
a reduction in the fluid pressure. The reduction in throughput is in
the direction of the fluid flow (forward propagation) while the pres-
sure occurs throughout the fluid (both forward and backward propa-
gation). While this appears to be the extent of the failure’s effect, the
other aspect depends on the location of the leaking pipe relative to
the remainder of the system. There are many types of components,
which would be affected by contacting a fluid, namely, electronics. This
interaction addresses the uncoupled boundary propagation for the
leaking pipe.
It is important to understand that all failure propagation types occur
in the positive temporal direction. Backward propagation is not back-
ward in time; instead it is related to the direction of the flow in the
FBDNom. For example, if a fuel tank is not filled (i.e., it is completely
empty) prior to starting the engine, the enginewill not start. The failure
of the vehicle to start would not be described by stating that “not filling
the tank with fuel” backward propagated from “engine will not start,”
even if this is suggested temporally. Instead, “not filling the tank with
fuel” forward propagates to cause “engine will not start.” Regardless of
the scenario, a failure initiates a propagation event and then each fail-
urepropagationpathprogresses fromthe location (i.e., function)where
the initiating failure occurred and in the positive temporal direction.
3.3.2 Develop failure propagation paths
An approach to model new failure propagation paths is presented in
this section. More specifically, the failure propagation path is modeled
in the FBDNom in this step of FFPPM (i.e., Step 2) to produce the FBDFail.
In the next step (i.e., Step 3), GNom and A(GNom) are updated with the
failure propagation paths to produce GFail and A(GFail).
Figure 4 presents the concept tomodel failure propagation paths. In
summary, a path is modeled for each “failure mode-behavior variable”
pair. Given a failure mode known to affect a specific behavior variable,
and contingent on the function-flow containing the same behavior
variable, a failure will propagate along the effected behavior variable
until the variable has ceased. When a function has multiple output
flows containing the behavior variable, the path diverges to encompass
both directions. When the behavior variable loops back on itself (e.g.,
control loop), the path ends. In this sense the temporal characteristic
of the failure mode is not considered; instead, it is assumed that each
function fails upon encountering a failure. The semantic use of path,
and more specifically failure propagation path, refers to the functions
and flows through which the initiating failure propagates. This is in
contrast to semantic use of flows which refer specifically to connec-
tions in an FBD. As such, a failure propagation path is the result of the
system configuration and an initiating failure whereas flows are the
result of only the system. This is shown in Figure 4 where red-colored
functions have failed and then propagate through the gold-colored
functions. Most functions are unaffected by a single failure propa-
gation path, shown using the gray-colored functions. The FBDFail is
the composition of the FBDNom and the failure propagation paths. To
support the consistent, repeatable modeling, this process utilizes a
tool (i.e., Matlab) to automate the generation of failure propagation
paths, databases to source failure mode data, and taxonomies and
ontologies to consistently represent themodels.
A database of historical failures is used to determine the can-
didate set of initiating failures. In prior research, the FFRDM50-
related functions to the occurrence of historical failure modes. The
database is comprised of 36,700historical failures organized using tax-
onomies for failuremodes,84,85 functions and functional flows,78,79 and
components.86 Failure rate data from non-electronic parts reliability
data (NPRD) were utilized to model the occurrence. A failure rate, 𝜆,
is a measure of the occurrence of failures over time. Assumptions of
the data include that it represents the systembeing analyzed, are accu-
rate, and that failures are independent. Thedatabase is used to retrieve
initiating failures as well as their predicted failure rates for a given
function.
Beyond historical failures, the discovery of new failure propagation
paths requires knowledge of the system’s behavior. The behavior dic-
tates the failure’s path. One approach to capturing the behavior is to
assert that failures propagate along a singular flow type (e.g., rota-
tional mechanical energy). In this case, a failure affects only the singu-
lar flow type in the FBD. While this approach was considered, failures
are physics-based when emerging in the system and often affect only a
portion of the flow. As such, this research focuses on a physics-based
approach by using the behavior variables associated with each func-
tional flow.
A set of behavior variables has been presented in the FBED79; how-
ever, the original work proposed only energy flow variables, which is
insufficient for work on failures in complex, cyber-physical systems. As
a result, the authors extend prior work to include behavior variables
for material and signal flows. As an example, behavior variables asso-
ciated with solid material include volume (V), dimensions (D), location
(L), and chemical elements (Ce). The complete list of behavior variables
is shown in Table 2.
Each functional-flow can have multiple behavior variables allow-
ing a path to only affect a portion of the flow. Further, multiple flow
types can share common behavior variables (e.g., acoustic, biological,
hydraulic, and pneumatic energy all contain the behavior variable pres-
sure). In this sense the failure propagates with the behavior variable
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F IGURE 4 Graphical concept tomodel failure propagation paths in an FBD
that it affects, even in the case where the function has multiple output
flows with the effected behavior variable. A complete failure propaga-
tion path beginswith the failed function then travels along the effected
behavior variable until it ends.
The consideration of nonstandard failure propagation paths may be
useful during early design, especially since unanticipated failure propa-
gation paths have played a significant role inmany historical failures.87
The FFPPM automatically produces many of these paths based on the
modeling approach presented. To ensure the value of the modeled
paths, expert knowledge should be utilized for identifying paths that
are senseless (e.g., path circling through the same function) or incorrect
(e.g., paths resulting from amodeling error).
3.4 FFPPM Step 3: Update the functional graph
and adjacency matrix, GFail & A(GFail)
Step 3 in FFPPM uses the FBDFail to formally add the failure propaga-
tion paths identified during Step 2 to the GNom and A(GNom) from Step
1. Similar to producing the FBDFail in the previous step, this step pro-
ducesGFail andA(GFail); however, GNom andA(GNom) are not replaced as
these are used as a part of themetrics.
To update GNom and A(GNom) with failure propagation information,
there are two types of connections to considered; nominal, or con-
nections utilized during the nominal operation of the system; failure
propagationwith the potential to be realized in the system in the event
of an initiating failure. The connection weight varies based on the con-
nection type. Nominal connections are given aweight of 1while failure
propagation connections are given a weight of 𝜆, where 𝜆 is the failure
rate of the initiating failure. 𝜆 is measured in units of time−1 and as a
result the practitioner should remain consistent with the specific units
(e.g., failures/million hours) across all data to minimize errors in when
merging the data. A value of 1 is used for a nominal connection to rep-
resent that the connection is always present in the system. Similarly,
the value of 𝜆 for a failure propagation connection is used to represent
the rate at which that connection would occur 88 during the system’s
operation.
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TABLE 2 A version of this table has been developed in 79 for the FBED. The information presented here includes the FBED flow hierarchy as
well as the corresponding definition, behavior variables, and behavior variable desigantors. The behavior variables and their designators are used
in this work to identify new failure propagation paths. The authors have extended the prior work in 79 by includingmore coverage and fidelity for
the behavior variables and their designators tomake them suitable for failure propagation
FBED flow
hierarchy FBED flow and definition
Behavior variables [Variable
designators]
Material Human. All or part of a personwho crosses the device boundary. volume [V], location [L]
Material Gas. Any collection of molecules characterized by randommotion and the absence
of bonds between themolecules.
volume [V], location [L], chemical
elements [Ce]
Material Liquid. Any readily flowing fluid, specifically having its molecules moving freely with
respect to each other, but because of cohesive forces, not expanding indefinitely.
volume [V], location [L], chemical
elements [Ce]
Material Solid. Any object withmass having a definite, firm shape. volume [V], location [L], chemical
elements [Ce], dimension [D]
Material Plasma. A collection of charged particles that is electrically neutral exhibiting some
properties of a gas, but differing from a gas in being a good conductor of electricity
and in being affected by amagnetic field.
volume [V], location [L], chemical
elements [Ce]
Material Mixture. A substance containing two ormore components which are not in fixed
proportions, do not lose their individual characteristics and can be separated by
physical means.
volume [V], location [L], chemical
elements [Ce]
Energy Human.Work performed by a person on a device. force [F], velocity [Ve]
Energy Acoustic.Work performed in t he production and transmission of sound. pressure [P], particle velocity [Pv]
Energy Biological.Work produced by or connectedwith plants or animals. pressure [P], volumetric flow [Vf]
Energy Chemical.Work resulting from the reactions by which substances are produced
from or converted into other substances.
affinity [A], reaction rate [Rr]
Energy Electrical.Work resulting from the flow of electrons from negative to a positive
source.
electromotive force [Ef], current [C]
Energy Electromagnetic. Energy that is propagated through free space or through amaterial
medium in the form of electromagnetic waves. It has both wave and particle-like
properties.
intensity [I], velocity [Ve]
Energy Hydraulic.Work that results from themovement and forces of a liquid, including
hydrostatic forces.
pressure [P], volumetric flow [Vf]
Energy Magnetic.Work resulting frommaterials that have the property of attracting other
likematerials, whether that quality is naturally occurring or electrically induced.
magnetomotive force [Mf], magnetic
flux rate [Mfr]
Energy Mechanical. Energy associatedwith themoving parts of a machine or the strain
energy associated with a loading state of an object.
torque [T], angular velocity [Av],
force [F], linear velocity [Lv]
Energy Pneumatic.Work resulting from a compressed gas flow or pressure sources. pressure [P]
Energy Radioactive (Nuclear).Work resulting from or produced by particles or rays, such as
alpha, beta and gamma rays, by the spontaneous disintegration of atomic nuclei.
intensity [I], decay rate [Dr]
Energy Thermal. A form of energy that is transferred between bodies as a result of their
temperature difference.
temperature [Te], heat rate [Hr]
Signal Status. A condition of some system, as in information about the state of the system. time [Ti], location [L], amplitude [Am]
Signal Control. A command sent to an instrument or apparatus to regulate amechanism. time [Ti], amplitude [Am]
For the failure propagation connections weights, in comparison to
theexistingnominalweights, a strategy is necessary tounderstandhow
each 𝜆 is distributed along the total length of each failure propagation
path. Two approaches are considered for this step. The first approach is
to consider that a failure has a total magnitude of 𝜆 and the value of 𝜆 is
distributed across the flows that it propagates across. Thus, the longer
a failure propagation path, the less affected each flow becomes. For
example, given that a failure propagates across five flows, the impact to
each flow is 𝜆/5.While this approachwas considered, it does notmodel
reality since the failure’s effect on the flow does not weaken as the fail-
ure propagation path lengthens. Further, nominal flows do not use this
approach. Finally, themotivation of this research is to inform designers
on how to produce systems that are robust to failure propagation. This
is not accomplished by lengthening the path in an attempt to dilute the
failure. As a result, the selected approach is to distribute 𝜆 to each flow
along the path. The selected approach promotes reducing the length
and risk of propagated failures. Figure 5 showsGFail and A(GFail) for the
example FBDFail.
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F IGURE 5 Updated graph, GFail, and nonbinary adjacencymatrix, A(GFail), for the example in Figure 2. GFail and A(GFail) contain both nominal
connections and failure propagation connections
F IGURE 6 R(G) matrix to define the connectivity ofGFail
3.5 FFPPM Step 4: Quantifying failure
propagation potential metrics
In this section, the authors propose three metrics to quantify fail-
ure propagation potential. In summary, these include (i) the summa-
tion of the reachability matrix, (ii) the summation of the number of
paths between nodes (i.e., functions) i and j for all i and j, and (iii) the
degree and degree distribution. From a system’s engineering perspec-
tive these can be interpreted as (i) the total number of steps required
to traverse from any one function (i.e., function i) to any other func-
tion (i.e., function j), summed for all combinations of starting and end-
ing functions, andwhere fewer steps represents amore connected sys-
tem; (ii) the total number of paths that the set of initiating failures
can take, whereas more paths offers more options for the failure to
propagate; and (iii) the number of input and output connections of each
function, which is used to identify if there exist specific functions that
contributes to many failure propagation paths. The details of each of
eachmetric are discussed in the following subsections.
3.5.1 Metric 1: Summation of the reachability
matrix
The first metric is determined using the reachability matrix, R(G). A
value, Xij, in R(G) represents the number of steps required to traverse
the graph from node i to node j. An example R(G) is presented in
Figure 6. In this example, it shows that four steps are required to
traverse from node 1 to node 4. It is important to note that multiple
paths can exist between two nodes. As such, the path with the smallest
value is presented inR(G). Using the example in Figure 5, two candidate
values are found for the reachability from node 3 to node 2; these
include 1 and 2. The value of 1 is smaller and therefore the one
that’s used.
To understand the relative difference in failure propagation poten-
tial between the FBDNom and FBDFail, the authors quantify values for a
complete graph and a ring graph, both with the same number of nodes
(i.e., n = 5 for this example). The minimum value, which is associated
with a high degree of failure propagation, is found by using a complete
graph, GComp. In a complete graph a node is connected to every other
node in the graph. Thus, a failure is transmitted to every other func-
tion of the system in a single step. On the other hand, the maximum
value is found by using a ring graph, GRing . In a ring graph, an edge exists
with two neighboring nodes; one edge enters from the prior node and
one exits to the following node. Due to its simplicity, the number of
nodes and edges in a ring graph are equal. The values quantified for
these graphs reasonably represent the limits of the failure propagation
potential for a graph of size n.
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TABLE 3 This shows a comparison of the first metric, the
summation of the reachability matrix, for several cases including GNom,
GFail, a five-node GRing , and a five-node GComp. GRing , and GComp have




GRing 50 100% Maximum number of steps to
traverse from node i to node j.
GNom 38 60% Baseline value for the number of
steps to traverse from node i to
node j for the system being
assessed.
GFail 37 57% Assessed value including failure
propagationmodeling for the
number of steps to traverse from
node i to node j for the system
being assessed.
GComp 20 0% Minimum number of steps to
traverse from node i to node j.
TABLE 4 This table shows the number of paths between nodes i
and j for GFail. For example, there are three paths between node 3 and
node 1. The beginning node is listed in the first columnwhile the









Function 1 0 1 1 1 1
Function 2 1 0 1 1 1
Function 3 3 3 0 1 3
Function 4 2 3 2 0 2
Environment 1 3 1 1 0
To quantify one aspect of the failure propagation potential, the
summation of R(G) is used. The summation is across all rows and all
columns, and therefore the result is a singular value. For the example
used in this section, the summation of R(G) is quantified for each graph
(see Table 3).
Results show an increased in GFail relative to GNom. A value of 37,
compared to 38, represents a higher failure propagation potential. The
results for GFail are smaller than those for GNom; however, the impor-
TABLE 5 Degree sequence for the example system presented in
this section. The cases shown are for the four graphs discussed in this
section including GNom, GFail, GRing , and GComp. The degree sequence in
a cell is presented as a coupled pair where the two numbers represent
the input and output degree of the particular node
GNom GFail GRing GComp
Function 1 1,1 2,1 1,1 5,5
Function 2 1,2 3,5 1,1 5,5
Function 3 1,1 3,1 1,1 5,5
Function 4 2,1 4,2 1,1 5,5
Environment 2,2 2,5 1,1 5,5
tance of the change to magnitude (i.e., 38 and 37) is not clear. The nor-
malized values show that a 3% change has occurred. The normalized
values are used to create a better understanding of the change. These
values set GRing and GComp to 100% and 0%, respectively.
3.5.2 Metric 2: Total number of paths
While R(G) contains much of the graph’s connection information, it
should be recognized that a failure propagation path can be inhibited
once the initiating failure has occurred. Given that the shortest path
is unavailable, there are often additional paths for the initiating failure
to propagate along. As a result, the second metric quantifies the total
number of paths available. For a given graph, this metric is the summa-
tion of all paths between nodes i and j. Table 4 displays results for the
GFail example.
The results show that most functions have more than one path
between them, indicating a high degree of failure propagation poten-
tial. As an example, there are three paths between node 3 and node
1, which means that there are three separate sequences of nodes
to traverse from node 3 to node 1. These paths include {3,2,Env.,1},
{3,4,Env.,1}, and {3,4,2,Env.,1}. Paths where nodes are revisited are
not counted (e.g., {3,2,Env.,3,2,Env.,1}). These number of these paths
are unlimited and represent the same information as those that are
included within this metric. Given that GFail is a directed graph, the
number of paths from node 1 to node 3 is not the same as node 3
to node 1. Thus, paths are specifically relative to the direction of the
arrows. Finally, the number of paths increases quickly as the graph
becomemore connected. This is shownmore clearly in the case study.
3.5.3 Metric 3: Degree and degree distribution,
deg(i), Pini (k), P
out
i (k)
The degree of a node, deg(i), represents that node’s connectivity to
adjacent nodes. The degree of a node i is the quantification of the total
number of edges between node i and all other nodes that are con-
nected to node i with a single edge. For directed graphs, edges are
either inbound or outbound. In this case, the degree of a node is pre-
sented as a degree sequence. The degree sequence is a coupled pair
of the number of inbound edges and number of outbound edges (e.g.,
number of inbound edges, number of outbound edges).89
While the degree sequence is specific to a nodewithin the graph, the
degree distribution quantifies the total number of nodes with a speci-
fied degree.82 Thus, the degree distribution represents the number of
nodes with degree 1, 2, . . . , N, where N is the highest degree of the
graph. In this research, the degree distribution is segregated by input,
Pini (k), and output, P
out
i (k).
Within the context of this research, thedegree sequence anddegree
distribution are useful to clearly identify highly connected nodes. In
many modern complex, cyber-physical systems, there exists an area of
the system that is designed to be highly connected. An example of this
is a Control Area Network (CAN),90 common in modern vehicles and
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F IGURE 7 Degree distribution for the example system presented in this section. The outbound degree distribution, Pouti (k), is shown on top
while the inbound, Pini (k), is shown on bottom. The cases shown are for the four graphs discussed in this section including GNom, GFail, GRing , and
GComp
especially autonomous vehicles, which shares information across the
system and acts as a hub for that information.While these elements of
the system are designed to be highly connected, current approaches
have not addressed the relative degree of connectedness between
these areas of the system and other areas of the system (e.g., structure,
thermal protection system, suspension, cooling system). The degree
sequence and degree distribution can be useful for understanding the
impact of these parts on the failure propagation of the system.
The degree sequence and degree distribution for the example in
this section are presented in Table 5 and Figure 7. Table 5 shows the
degree sequence for four graphs; GNom, GFail, GFail, and GComp. Figure 7
shows the degree distribution for the same graphs (i.e., GNom (blue),
GFail (red), GRing (green), and GComp (yellow). The results show a notice-
able increase in failure propagation potential.
The GRing column of Table 5 demonstrates the theoretical minimum
degree sequence. This shows that each node in the graph has a single
input and a single output connection. The GComp column shows a stan-
dardmaximum given a complete graph. The only reason that this is not
the theoretical maximum is due to the fact that a GComp connects node
i and jwith a single connection, whereas it is possible to have additional
connections. In the event that more edges were present in a five-node
graph, values greater than5arepermitted.While there is no limit to the
maximum value in the degree sequence, a GComp is a commonly used
graph that establishes a point of comparison and also represents a very
tightly connected graph.89
3.5.4 FFPPM output
Given the variety of each individual design process, the approach for
implementing this research can vary significantly. The authors do not
specifically recommend how the output of FFPPM should be imple-
mented for a specific system; however, it is useful to identify some of
the example options. One option is to define requirements for each
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F IGURE 8 An example FBDNom for the ECCS
of the metrics presented in Step 4. This approach leverages the nat-
ural process of requirement verification and validation that systems
undergoduring theendof thedesignprocess. This is a particularly valu-
able approach given the continued emphasis placed on requirements
throughout the design process. An alternative option is to employ
FFPPM for risk reduction. This would entail applying themethod, mak-
ing design changes to reduce the failure propagation potential, then
reapplying the method, and measuring the affect of the design change.
More insight is provided on the use of themetrics in the discussion (see
Section 5).
4 CASE STUDY
To effectively demonstrate FFPPM, a case study is presented through-
out this section. The case study uses the emergency core cooling
system (ECCS) of a pressurized water reactor (PWR) nuclear power
plant.
4.1 FFPPM prestep: Develop FBDNom
To demonstrate the proposed methodology, an example FBDNom of an
ECCS is presented (see Figure 8). It should be noted that while the
ECCS example is representative of such systems found on a commer-
cial PWRs, the authors explicitly state that the case study is not to be
used for any purpose other than the demonstration of FFPPM.
Froma practical perspective onmodeling FBDs, functional flows are
often modeled together. For example, hot water would often be repre-
sented as hot water instead of thermal energy andwater each as an inde-
pendent functional flow.Hot andwater are only contiguous.
4.2 FFPPM Step 1: Construct the functional
graph and adjacency matrix, GNom and A(GNom)
The FBDNom in Figure 8 is expressed as GNom and A(GNom) using Equa-
tions (3) and (4) (see Figure 9).
4.3 FFPPM Step 2: Develop failure propagation
flows and edge weights
The development of failure propagation paths, and ultimately FBDFail,
utilizes the process previously discussed in Figure 4. The initiating fail-
ure corrosion is usedas an illustrative example.While theECCSexample
in this section contains 27 initiating failures from theFFRDMdatabase,
corrosion is selected as the illustrative example based on its frequent
occurrence in systems and because most engineers have a general
knowledge of the failure. Corrosion causes a reduction in material
strength, leading to pitting, voids, and cracks and ultimately material
failures.29 From the database shown in Figure 4, Function 9.0 distribute
liquid fails due to corrosion. As indicated by the name, the function’s
intent is to direct liquid to multiple locations throughout the system.
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F IGURE 9 GNom and A(GNom) representation to describe nodes
and edges for the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) FBDNom.
Note that the “Environment” node represents any flow that crosses
the system boundary shown in Figure 8
The failure of distribute liquid due to corrosion has several potential
effects. First, liquid volume (i.e., behavior variable V)may be decreased
due to an increase in the material resistance across which the liquid
transfers or from leaking. Second, liquid pressure (i.e., behavior vari-
able P) is affected in the forward and backward direction based on its
relationship to liquid volume. Third, any leaking has the potential to
interfere with electrical energy flows including the behavior variables
of electromotive force (i.e., behavior variable Ef) and electrical current
(i.e., behavior variable C). In summary, corrosion disrupts liquid disrup-
tion through the behavior variables of liquid volume, pressure, electro-
motive force, and electrical current. The result of these failure propa-
gation paths is shown in Figure 10; this example is for corrosion in the
distribute liquid function and therefore only represents a subset of all
flows that have been added.
4.4 FFPPM Step 3: Update the functional graph
and adjacency matrix, GFail and A(GFail)
Figure 11 showsGFail and A(GFail) for the ECCS. Note that this matrix is
sparse, even with the addition of known initiating failures.
4.5 FFPPM Step 4: Quantifying failure
propagation potential metrics
This section presents the results for the case study.
4.5.1 Metric 1: Summation of the reachability
matrix
Results for metric 1 are shown in Table 6. In the sum(R(G)) column,
results are generated by summing all rows and columns in R(G). In the
Normalized sum(R(G)) column, the difference between 1274 and 182
is set as the maximum (i.e., 100%) and minimum (i.e., 0%) values. When
comparing the results, the value of 23% relative to 39% represents that
the GFail has fewer steps for the initiating failure to travel. In this case,
a lower value is more detrimental to the system.
4.5.2 Metric 2: Total number of paths
Results for metric 2 are shown in Table 7. In the graph shown in
Figure 11, there are many paths between Functions 2 and 8. For exam-
ple, some of the shorter paths are [2 5 8], [2 4 8], and [2 4 7 8].
While the first metric captures the connection between Functions
2 and 8, it quantifies this with a value of 2 since the shortest path
between these is two steps. However, in the event that certain func-
tions have failed, and the shortest paths are eliminated, there are a
significant number of remaining paths that will propagate the failure.
Thus, the metrics address different aspects of the failure propagation
potential.
4.5.3 Metric 3: Degree and degree distribution,
deg(i), Pini (k), P
out
i (k)
Results for metric 3 are shown in Table 8 and Figure 12. These results
are discussed separately in this section.
In Table 8, the GNom column predominately shows a degree
sequence with values of 3 or less. Given the high-level nature of the
GNom in Figure 9, values ranging from 1 to 3 in the degree sequence are
expected. In comparison, the GFail column shows a significantly higher
degree sequence. The average degree sequence of the GNom is 1.64
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F IGURE 10 Example FBDFail with failure propagation paths (red) for leaking due to corrosion
whereas the average for the GFail is 3.14. While the numbers are dou-
ble of one another, it can only be stated that the GFail has a higher
failure propagation potential, with respect to degree sequence, when
compared to GNom. This is important because the degree sequence is
a count of all edges. Thus, the most well-used nominal connection has
the same value as the more rare failure mode. Metric 3 is agnostic of
edge weight, which demonstrates the need for having multiple metrics
to assess failure propagation potential.
The results in Figure 12 are best reviewed in conjunctionwith those
in Table 8. These two results represent the same information from
two viewpoints. To build on the results already discussed, the degree
sequencequantifies thenumber of nodes (vertical axis) that have a spe-
cific degree. For example,GRing has a degree of 1 for each input andout-
put node. In Figure 12 this is shown as a count of 14 for a degree of 1
on both the top bar chart (outbound degree distribution) and the bot-
tom bar chart (inbound degree distribution). With respect to the GNom
(blue) and GFail (red) specifically, the shift in results is evident. The shift
in themass of the histogram from left to right demonstrates the higher
level of connectivity. In this case, there are several more nodes with a
significantly higher degree in the GFail than in GNom.
4.5.4 Summary of metric
The output of the FFPPM is summarized in Table 6, Table 7, Figure 12,
andTable 8. Additionally, Sections 3.5.4 and5discuss suggested uses of
this output within the context of the design process.
5 DISCUSSION OF PROPOSED METRICS,
ASSUMPTIONS, LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH,
AND FUTURE WORK
The FBD is a standardmodel used in the design process. Nominally this
model does not include any failure propagation flows. Section 3.3 dis-
cussed the specific types of failure propagation, one of which (i.e., for-
ward propagation) are naturally represented in the FBDNom. However,
this is only with respect to their paths, not the edge weights. Back-
ward and uncoupled boundary propagation paths must be added. As
a result, this work updates the FBDNom in Step 2 of FFPPM to become
FBDFail. Identifying this concept is important because the inclusion of
failure propagation flow paths is not necessary for all uses of the FBD.
For example, it is likely to not be necessary for concept generation as
the flows would affect the solution. While the authors have not tested
this, it is reasoned that failure propagation paths would then be phys-
ically implemented during the concept generation process, especially
using automated techniques. Thus, the realization of these paths dur-
ing concept generation is likely not beneficial toward design. As a con-
trast to using the FBDFail for concept generation, it may be practi-
cal for developing a functional hazard analysis (FHA). During the pro-
cess to develop an FHA, which is mandated by the Department of
Defense (DoD) and specified inMIL-STD-882,91 understanding all pos-
sible functional flows paths that are caused by a failure can be invalu-
able. Further, having an associated methodology to implement failure
propagation paths provides additional value because the FBDFail can
be generated with some level of repeatability. The FHA task within
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F IGURE 11 Graph (GFail) and adjacencymatrix (A(GFail)) representation to describe nodes and connections for the ECCS FBDFail. Note that the
“Environment” node represents any flow that crosses the system boundary shown in Figure 8. This graph showsmore connections than the
nominal version, GNom, shown in Figure 9
MIL-STD-882 does not have an associate methodology, leaving the
practitioner to develop their own. In light of these two examples, the
user of an FBDFail would need to carefully identify its use beyond its
use in the proposed FFPPM.
The models and metrics developed in this research can be used in a
variety of ways. Some examples are discussed here. The first is to iden-
tify high-risk functionswithin the system.High risk functions are either
have a large number of connections or a high total connection weight
when being compared to to analogies within the same system. Due to
the systemremaining purely functionalwhenFFPPM is applied, system
designers can emphasize the high-risk functions during subsequent
development efforts (e.g., documenting high-risk functions as program
risks, procuring high-reliability parts, contracting suppliers early, using
high-risk functions as candidate critical items). Another potential appli-
cation of the metrics is to identify critical flow pathways. Function
connectedby fewpathwaysmay indicate critical flowpathways.92 Crit-
ical flow pathways with little or no redundancy can then be redesigned
with additional redundancyor riskmitigationmaybe imposed via other
means (e.g., high reliability safety system designation, reduced reliance
on critical flow path). Further, the authors suggest the set of metrics be
used to iteratively measure and reduce failure propagation. The initial
application may serve as a set of derived requirements, one for each of
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TABLE 6 Comparison of the summation of the reachability matrix,





GRing 1274 100% Minimum number of steps to
traverse from node i to node j.
GNom 609 39% Baseline value for the number of
steps to traverse from node i to
node j for the system being
assessed.
GFail 446 24% Assessed value including failure
propagationmodeling for the
number of steps to traverse from
node i to node j for the system
being assessed.
GComp 182 0% Maximum number of steps to
traverse from node i to node j.
the previously discussed metrics, while subsequent applications pro-
vide a measure of improvement toward reducing the system’s failure
propagation potential. Finally, the failure propagation paths derived in
Step 2 of the method can be used toward the development of fault
trees. Fault trees are commonly used models to assess system safety
and reliability and to identify root cause(s) during a failure investi-
gations. The propagation of a failure using functional-flow behavior
variables implies a cause–effect relationship, identical to the type of
relationship found in a fault tree. Further work would be needed to
correctly merge failure propagation paths within the context of the
top-level failure used in a fault tree. Additional applications of thiswork
may be found beyond the brief examples here.
The authors note several assumptions made in this research. First,
propagated failures are modeled as sudden and complete. The first
result of this is that partial failures are not being investigated. Fur-
ther, the time-based element of failure propagation is not modeled. A
propagation path can go through a function that slowly degrades. We
have assumed this degradation to occur immediately. Additionally, fail-
ureeffect is disregarded. The system’s connectivitydetermines the sys-
tem’s effect of a failure, which is based on the length of the propaga-
tion path. Even if the length were changed by the system being recon-
figured, the initial failure value remains 𝜆. Failure limits for the system
have not been modeled; however, these limits are not currently avail-
able during functional design. These assumptions meet the intent of
measuring the potential of the failure propagation. As a final assump-
tion, the system is modeled using the FBDNom, where there are sev-
eral nodes explicitly modeled; however, the environment is modeled
using a single node. This assumption dictates that failure paths only
need one step outside the system before they reenter. Further, the
environment is assumed to contain all behavior variables. This allows
exiting flows to reenter if the same behavior variable is an input. Past
research demonstrates the legitimacy of propagating failures through
the environment for a nuclear power plant.93 An alternative approach
should be taken if this assumption is invalid for the system being
analyzed.
Limitations of the data used in this research are discussed here.
First, it should be recognized that the database may not accurately
represent the system being modeled. For example, a variety of factors
can impact the applicability of historical failure rate data including dif-
ference in the system’s operational environments, failure limits, sys-
tem domain (e.g., power, automotive, aerospace). The degree to which
this information to match the system being designed is a measure
of the historical data’s applicability. Organizations that have designed
similar historical systems should consider data applicability through
system similarity (e.g., functionality, architecture,manufacturing, oper-
ation). Generalized databases, such as the NPRD,94 that contain data
from a large variety of systems will increase the uncertainty in the
results. Further, databases require the transcription of data which are
prone to errors. While this is clear in the case of data, it should be
noted that models will suffer the same limitation. Finally, early design
models are often not updated once the system enters the detailed
design phase. For example, as the system is matured throughout the
detailed design phase, derived requirements are added to the system
specification; however, due to short design schedules and limited bud-
gets, no further changes are applied to system models. While model-
based systems engineering (MBSE) and digital engineering are quickly
building momentum as viable design approaches and would sustain
the accuracy of early models throughout the design process, such
design approaches remain uncommon. As such, repositories sourced
with early design models may increase the uncertainty in the results
of FFPPM.While uncertainty introduced by historical data andmodels
is an important consideration, the intent of many early design analyses
is to capture potential issues in the system and then to strategize a cor-
rective action. This is inherently an open-ended activity that can bene-
fit from a limited amount of uncertainty as it considers awider breadth
of candidate issues.
Metrics are intended to be independent. In the scenario wheremet-
rics are independent, a practitioner can target changes to the design
that would affect only one metric. While independence is often a basic
assumption, it is rarely achieved in practice. The authors recognize that
the metrics presented here are not fully independent. For example,
when the degree distribution increases, the adjacency matrix will also
change. While the metrics are not independent, the authors recognize
that each provides a unique point of view on the failure propagation
potential and therefore remain useful. In addition, futureworkwill con-
tinue to explore metrics related to intervals (e.g., Ref.95), entropy, and
game theory.
In this research the authors show the connectedness of an FBD,
for both the FBDNom and the FBDFail, which presents a mathemati-
cal approach to quantifying failure propagation potential during func-
tional design. The limitation of this is that all connections are weighted
equally. In practice, not all connections in a system are functionally
equivalent; safety features in a system would be weighted stronger
thanmostother features.Also,many flowsareusedduring the system’s
common operation while others are reserved for specialized and infre-
quent operation. From a requirements point of view, functional flows
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TABLE 7 This table shows the number of paths functions i and j for GFail. Function is abbreviate with F in this table
F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 F10 F11 F12 F13 Env.
F1 0 1 440 47 1 86 160 90 111 160 75 75 75 31
F2 440 0 440 47 1 86 160 90 111 160 75 75 75 31
F3 1 1 0 47 1 86 160 90 111 160 75 75 75 31
F4 165 165 165 0 165 143 247 168 143 247 107 107 107 116
F5 275 275 275 197 0 100 295 166 163 295 142 142 142 20
F6 133 133 133 158 133 0 272 158 171 272 110 110 110 151
F7 73 73 73 69 73 61 0 50 42 141 62 62 62 69
F8 62 62 62 32 62 68 163 0 68 163 49 49 49 51
F9 59 59 59 77 59 30 190 77 0 190 53 53 53 58
F10 73 73 73 69 73 61 141 50 42 0 62 62 62 69
F11 198 198 198 191 198 205 354 169 205 354 0 249 249 165
F12 90 90 90 116 90 84 164 111 97 164 1 0 1 46
F13 129 129 129 152 129 129 288 145 160 288 1 402 0 58
Env. 213 213 213 192 213 78 288 192 155 288 153 153 153 0
TABLE 8 Degree sequence for the ECCS
GNom GFail GRing GComp
Function 1 1,1 1,1 1,1 13,13
Function 2 1,2 1,2 1,1 13,13
Function 3 2,1 6,1 1,1 13,13
Function 4 1,1 2,5 1,1 13,13
Function 5 1,2 1,2 1,1 13,13
Function 6 0,1 1,5 1,1 13,13
Function 7 2,1 6,2 1,1 13,13
Function 8 5,2 5,5 1,1 13,13
Function 9 1,3 4,5 1,1 13,13
Function 10 2,1 6,2 1,1 13,13
Function 11 1,1 1,5 1,1 13,13
Function 12 3,1 6,3 1,1 13,13
Function 13 0,2 1,2 1,1 13,13
Environment 3,4 3,4 1,1 13,13
relating to shall requirements would be more important than those
derived from should or will requirements.74 As a result, the failure of
these safety features are also not equal. To extend the work presented
in this research, theweight of the connections in the FBDNom graphwill
be estimated. This addition will improve the graph-based metrics pre-
sented in this paper.
Another limitation to be aware of in applying this approach is one
that accompaniesmost functionalmodels in general:models are gener-
ally not exhaustive in termsof representing everypossible combination
of system events and their interactions with every possible combina-
tion of events in the system’s environment.96 Modeling as many com-
binations of behavior as possible can help provoke the identification
of the hard-to-predict uncoupled boundary propagation when merged
with research on modeling emergent emergent behaviors.97 Mon-
terey Phoenix (MP) 98 is a behavior modeling approach and language
that separates system behaviors and system interactions formally in
a way that enables different, sometimes unexpected, combinations of
behavior to emerge in simulation.99 Functional modeling could bene-
fit from MP’s scope-complete scenario generation capability (exhaus-
tive up to a user-defined scope limit) by providing more behav-
ior scenarios to further refine the graph-based metrics discussed in
this paper.
The ECCS example applied in this is based on knowledge of the
system it represents. However, the example is limited in scope and is
shown for illustrative purposes. Futureworkwill validate FFPPMusing
case studies and the validation square.100,101 The results presented in
this work should not be applied to a real system.
An important aspect of a methodologies is its scalability to large
systems. The application of FFPPM to a system with a significantly
large number of functions, including a system of systems (SoS), would
present challenges. The automation of failure propagation paths has
greatly benefited scalability, the automation does not cover the full
spectrum of the proposed work. As a result, the authors plan to for-
malize the approach with dedicated rules such that the process to add
failure propagation flows can be automated.
Finally, this work currently does not include operatingmodeswithin
the FBDNom, and therefore the affect of these operating modes on the
estimation of functional failure propagation has been omitted. Follow-
on work will incorporate operating modes into the metrics presented
in this paper.
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F IGURE 12 Degree distribution for the ECCS system
6 CONCLUSION
Due to the increased complexity ofmodern systems, theunderstanding
and assessment of failure propagation has become increasingly impor-
tant. As such, this paper presents a framework to quantify failure prop-
agation potential for complex, cyber-physical systems during the con-
ceptual stages of design when functions are typically modeled prior
to availability of detailed physical specification. To completely model
each failure, three types of failure propagation are formalized: forward,
backward, and uncoupled. Directed graphs are used to model the sys-
tem including nominal and failure propagation edges. With the inclu-
sion of failure propagation paths to the FBDNom, producing the FBDFail,
metrics are proposed to quantify the failure propagation potential.
These include (i) the summation of the reachability matrix, (ii) the sum-
mation of the number of paths between nodes (i.e., functions) i and j for
all i and j, and (iii) the degree and degree distribution. Results in Sec-
tion 4 show the relative difference between the FBDNom, FBDFail, and a
ring and complete graph of the same size. These metrics are intended
to provide the designer with additional knowledge during conceptual
system design.
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